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This essay, which briefly surveys the nation's recent 
economic performance and the variety of informed opinion 
concerning needed corrective policy, is intended particularly 
as background reading for the nine essays that follow it. All 
of the nine have been published previously. Indeed, four of 
them comprised the slimmer 1969 edition of this book. The 
original title of 1969 has been retained for this new enlarged 
edition because it has become even more apt with the passage 
of time.
In the interval between the two editions, politicians, 
policymakers, and professional economists in general have 
come to recognize the durability of a phenomenon that they 
had been inclined to regard as transient: the coexistence of 
high rates of unemployment and of wage-price increase. Of 
ficeholders learned in the 1976 and 1980 election campaigns 
that the waggish "misery" or "discomfort" index, which 
merely summed together the unemployment and inflation 
rates, could change from a toy to a dangerous weapon in the
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hands of officeseekers. 1 Zealous economic fac 
tions—monetarists, rational expectationists, supply-siders, 
and post-Keynesians—have emerged to challenge and mock 
the "neoclassical synthesis," the paradigm that reigned 
supreme in macroeconomic textbooks since the end of World 
War II yet failed
to suggest how the goals of full employment and 
price stability could be achieved conjointly, thus 
avoiding the need to make a Phillipsian choice be 
tween the two—or even to explain how recession 
and inflation could occur simultaneously, as they 
did throughout the 1970s. 2
The Phillips curve itself started as a simple statement of 
trade-off between unemployment and inflation, but it has 
had to undergo extensive reformulation for continuing ser-
1. The "discomfort" designation is often attributed to A.M. Okun. Candidate Carter used 
the adjective "misery" in taunting incumbent Ford in 1976; in 1980, incumbent Carter was, 
in turn, the target.
Instead of simply adding the annual percentage change in prices to the average annual 
rate of unemployment, some index makers have proposed (1) the introduction of weights 
and (2) the inclusion of the annual percentage in Gross National Product as a third compo 
nent with a negative weight. See, for example, a letter to The Economist (London), 
November 29, 1980, p. 6.
2. A.S. Eichner, "Introduction," in A.S. Eichner, ed., A Guide to Post-Keynesian 
Economics, M.E. Sharpe, White Plains, 1979, p. 10.
The attack on ruling doctrine is well described in a special issue of The Public Interest, 
1980, entitled "The Crisis in Economic Theory," especially these four articles: J.W. Dean, 
"The Dissolution of the Keynesian Consensus," pp. 19-34; A.H. Meltzer, "Monetarism 
and the Crisis in Economics," pp. 35-45; M.H. Willes, " 'Rational Expectations' as a 
Counterrevolution," pp. 81-96; and Paul Davidson, "Post Keynesian Economics: Solving 
the Crisis in Economic Theory," pp. 151-173. Another informative paper is by Brian Kan- 
tor, "Rational Expectations and Economic Thought," Journal of Economic Literature, 
December 1979, pp. 1422-1441. It should be noted, in passing, that Keynes was too broad 
and complex a thinker to be characterized as a "Keynesian" in the sense in which this ad 
jective has commonly been used since his death in 1946. On this point, see, for example, 
T.M. Humphrey, "Keynes on Inflation," in 1980 Annual Report, Federal Reserve Bank of 
Richmond, pp. 5-16.
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viceability as a tool of analysis and econometric estimation. 3 
In 1978, the Employment Act of 1946 (P.L. 79-304), which 
expressed a federal resolve "to promote maximum employ 
ment, production, and purchasing power," was at last revis 
ed to include the additional explicit resolve of promoting 
"reasonable price stability."
The remainder of this essay is organized into four sections. 
The first reviews the nation's experience of unemployment 
and inflation since the end of World War II in context with 
the Employment Act and the law that drastically amended it 
in 1978, the (Humphrey-Hawkins) Full Employment and 
Balanced Growth Act (P.L. 95-523). The second section ex 
amines the sources of the inflation that has persisted since 
the mid-1960s and that has occasioned the preparation of the 
two editions of this book. The third section samples the 
views of economic and other experts on the prospects and 
methods of disinflation and the restoration of wholesome 
growth. The concluding section comments on the need—and 
a way—to mitigate the unemployment side-effects of a prob 
able major campaign to achieve disinflation.
By design, this essay is confined to literature and other 
public information available in 1980. Accordingly, it does
3. Illustrative of the writings on the evolving Phillips curve are: two papers by Milton 
Friedman, "The Role of Monetary Policy," American Economic Review, March 1968, pp. 
1-17, and "Inflation and Unemployment," Journal of Political Economy, June 1977, pp. 
457-472; E.S. Phelps, "Phillips Curves, Expectations of Inflation, and Optimal Employ 
ment Over Time," Economica, August 1967, pp. 254-281; G.L. Perry, "Slowing the Wage- 
Price Spiral," in A.M. Okun and G.L. Perry, eds., Curing Chronic Inflation, Brookings 
Institution, Washington, 1978, pp. 23-55; G.L. Perry, "Inflation in Theory and Practice," 
in Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1980, pp. 207-241; Philip Cagan, Persistent 
Inflation: Historical and Policy Essays, Columbia University Press, New York, 1979, 
especially Chapter 8 on "The Reduction of Inflation and the Magnitude of 
Unemployment," and Chapter 9 on "The Relation of Inflation to Slack Demand"; Gen- 
nifer Sussman, "A Summary and Critique of the McCracken Report," an appendix to 
C.E. Beigie, Inflation Is a Social Malady, British-North American Committee, March 
1979, pp. 60-72; T.M. Humphrey, "Changing Views of the Phillips Curve," in his Essays 
on Inflation, 2d ed., Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 1980, pp. 62-73; and idem, 
"Some Recent Developments in Phillips Curve Analysis," ibid., pp. 74-82.
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not presume to predict or prejudge the final economic agen 
da of the new Reagan Administration. It does, however, take 
some cognizance of viewpoints and proposals that have ac 
quired greater political authority as a result of the November 
elections.
Between—and Behind—the Acts
Although the declared purposes of the Employment Act 
and the Humphrey-Hawkins Act have commonly beer 
characterized as "commitments" or "mandates," they are 
better described as unfulfillable "resolves" or breakable 
"pledges." The first pair of words have a solemn and uncon 
ditional ring already belied by initial experience in ad 
ministration of the 1978 law—as well as by the long history 
of argumentation over the practical meaning of the 1946 law. 
Reality stands in no awe of congressional or executive 
rhetoric, and nowhere has it flouted federal fiat more plainly 
than in the quest for high-level employment with stable 
prices.
The heart of the landmark Employment Act of 1946 was a 
single 11-line sentence constituting a "Declaration of 
Policy" (Section 2), and the arms were a new Council of 
Economic Advisers (which would assist the president in 
preparation of an annual report) and a joint congressional 
committee (which would receive and review the report). The 
single sentence asserted, but with eager qualification, a 
"continuing policy and responsibility of the Federal govern 
ment" to promote the three objectives already cited. Despite 
the minimal machinery and the omission of any explicit 
reference to stable prices, no president in office between 
1946 and 1978 ever felt inhibited from taking steps to deter 
or counteract inflation. If authority were deemed necessary, 
it could always have been read into the notion of maximum 
"purchasing power."
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The Humphrey-Hawkins Act announced quantitative 
unemployment and disinflation objectives and dates for 
substantial progress toward them. Thus, as provisional 
unemployment goals for 1983, it specified reduction of the 
jobless rate for the labor force as a whole to 4 percent and of 
the rate for persons 20 years old and older to 3 percent; and 
it also aimed for moderation of the rise in the Consumer 
Price Index to 3 percent by the same year. Furthermore, it 
contemplated achievement of still lower unemployment rates 
corresponding to "full employment" by some unstated later 
date; and it called for a "zero" price rise by 1988. But the 
law has a loophole: It allowed revision of the indicated 
schedules, and the president (and the Congress) exercised the 
permitted option to defer at the earliest opportunity! The 
1978 commitment, then, is no firmer than the 1946 resolve; 
and, although jobs and prices seem to have become twin 
pillars of public policy, they also remain the horns of a 
dilemma of policy.
Historically, it is as easy to explain omission of price 
restraint from the 1946 charter for federal involvement in the 
functioning of the economy as to explain inclusion in the 
1978 amendments. During World War II, formal controls 
masked the inflationary potential that would burst into being 
in the aftermath. Meanwhile, full or overfull employment 
was discovered to be feasible—a welcome contrast to the 
idleness of the 1930s, when price "reflation" was also deem 
ed healthier than further price reduction. Before 1946, the 
bear and the bull were the best-known members of the 
popular and professional economic bestiary, and the spoor 
of "stagflation" was not yet suspected. Existence of the new 
brute was hinted in the 1950s and 1960s but did not become 
confirmed until the 1970s.
Funny things can—and do—happen to a bill on the way 
through a quorum, as anyone acquainted with our nation's
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legislative process is aware. S. 380, wishfully called the "Full 
Employment Act of 1945," lost its adjective and its principal 
parts in a familiar rite of passage. It was replaced by the far 
less ambitious Employment Act of 1946, which represented 
the maximum consensus attainable at the time. 4 This law has 
often since been miscalled the "Full Employment Act of 
1946"—out of defiance, nostalgia, or simple ignorance. On 
the other hand, some of the strong supporters of S. 380 later 
came to recognize that its failure to become law was prov 
idential to the reputation of economists and that the 
Employment Act of 1946 was not a hollow mockery after 
all. 5
With the unexpected maintenance of high-level employ 
ment after World War II, attention soon shifted to the prob 
lem of price moderation in the decontrolled economy. How 
many of the unhappy warriors who would not forgive or 
forget the Capitol crime against S. 380 have remembered 
that President Truman called the Congress into special ses 
sion in November 1947 to consider a 10-point program for 
dealing sternly with the post-control price explosion? 
Truman's phrase, "do-nothing Congress," still lingers in the 
ear; but who recalls that the plausibility of this bit of cam 
paign hyperbole rested in part on the failure of a second 
special session to accept the president's anti-inflation pro-
4. The evolution of S. 380 into the Employment Act has been recounted by S.K. Bailey, 
Congress Makes a Law, Vintage Books, New York, 1964.
5. Robert Lekachman refers in The Age of Keynes, Vintage Books, 1966, p. 173, to the 
"unwitting service to the reputation of economists" done by the Congress in rejection of 
the "key section" of S. 380. J.K. Galbraith adds, in Money: Whence It Came, Where It 
Went, New York, Bantam Books, 1976, p. 323: "It is doubtful if those who participated in 
the first drafting of S. 380 . . . would, in the light of later history, have asked for much 
more." Contrary to a common impression, L.H. Keyserling, who had served in the 
Truman Council of Economic Advisers, did not share in the "liberal" enthusiasm for S. 
380 and also considers the Employment Act preferable; see his "The Council of Economic 
Advisers since 1946: Its Contributions and Failures," Atlantic Economic Journal, March 
1978, pp. 17-19.
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posals in June 1948? 6 Furthermore, how many of today's 
"liberal" admirers of Truman know that his Council of 
Economic Advisers was already expressing concern that col 
lective bargaining imparted an upward bias to prices?
In the 1950s, the increasing inflation-proneness of the 
economy was concealed only temporarily by the strict wage- 
price controls prompted by the Korean conflict. Before the 
end of the first Eisenhower term and well into the second, 
upthrusting industrial prices caused considerable official 
alarm. The practice of "fiscal prudence" and the preach 
ment of wage-price-productivity truisms had little evident ef 
fect; but, at high cost in unemployment (which could have 
influenced critically the outcome of the 1960 presidential 
election), tough monetary measures did help to rein in prices 
by the end of the decade. Some economists were coming to 
see that inflation was the head of a price coin and deflation 
the tail of an employment coin, so that both of these faces 
could show simultaneously.
The price bulge manifested in the middle Eisenhower years 
was negligible compared to the uptrend of 1965-80, but it 
provoked sharp and quick dismay—as did also the price up 
surge that followed the lifting of World War II controls. The 
slow public responsiveness after the 1940s and 1950s need 
not show that the nerves improve with the aggravation of the 
inflationary disease. Rather, it may be another sign of the 
ease with which a wealthy, developed country could, at last 
irreversibly, turn into another volatile and frenetic manana 
republic.
In the 1960 and 1961 Economic Report of the President, 
the last two of the Eisenhower Administration, the earlier 
price bulge was still remembered: The suggestion was made
6. J.G. Knapp, Edwin G. Nourse—Economist for the People, Danville, IL, Interstate 
Printers and Publishers, 1979, pp. 263-64 and 280-81.
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that the Employment Act be amended to include reasonable 
price stability as a fourth explicit objective. Perhaps, it is not 
irrelevant that two of the three members of the Council of 
Economic Advisers at the time had experienced the 
disastrous German hyperinflation of the early 1920s.
The 1960s began with great expectations of a New 
Economics on a New Frontier, proceeded to inauguration of 
a Great Society, and ended in a New Ordeal of inflation that 
still rages. In the first half of the decade, unemployment was 
reduced dramatically with little price advance—thanks to the 
legacy of Eisenhower slack, to the adoption of wage-price- 
productivity "guideposts" and their occasional reinforce 
ment with presidential threats, and to the bold and 
overcelebrated tax cut of 1964. In the second half of the 
decade, while the New Economics was still congratulating 
itself, fiscal discipline broke down; increasing involvement in 
Vietnam, the expansion of "uncontrollable" expenditures 
for social welfare, and rising private demand required some 
reversal of the 1964 tax cut, but a new levy could not be 
enacted promptly. Like the sorcerer's apprentice, the practi 
tioners of economic activism found that it was easier to turn 
on the fiscal taps than to turn them off.
In the 1970s, unemployment and inflation finally became 
recognized by the media and political leaders as inseparable 
and significant "issues." Recessions engineered during the 
decade through monetary actions clearly destroyed jobs but 
failed to reduce the rate at which unit production costs were 
advancing. Unemployment, furthermore, was worsened by 
intense foreign competition on our own terrain as well as in 
markets abroad. Robust productivity gains could no longer 
be expected to diminish the labor-cost impact of unabating 
wage rises. A serial revolution in the price of petroleum im 
ports, crop failures, and material shortages also contributed 
to the upward pressure on costs.
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Two presidents felt required to try to block the tide. In 
August 1971, mandatory wage-price controls were suddenly 
and surprisingly instituted; in 1973, they were inopportunely 
dismantled. Another try at restraint was initiated in October 
1978, the same month that the Humphrey-Hawkins Act was 
signed into law; but the new voluntary curbs have proved as 
ineffectual as their timid and flawed design foreshadowed.
In its 22 discursive pages, the Humphrey-Hawkins Act of 
1978 seeks "to strengthen and supplement the purposes and 
policies of the Employment Act of 1946." Its Section 102 
lengthens the 11-line sentence constituting Section 2 of the 
1946 law into a 17-line sentence plus 9 largely redundant ex 
planatory paragraphs. The extended sentence upgrades the 
original employment and production objectives from "max 
imum" to "full," translates the ambiguous goal of "max 
imum purchasing power" into "increased real income," and 
finally adds the goal of "reasonable price stability." It 
grandly asserts still other economic goals of the heart's 
desire: "balanced growth, a balanced federal budget, ade 
quate productivity growth, proper attention to national 
priorities," and "achievement of an improved trade balance 
through increased exports and improvement in ... interna 
tional competitiveness."
Although the rest of the Humphrey-Hawkins Act offers 
hints as to priorities and preferences as to procedures, any 
conscientious administrator could distill only equivocal and 
incomplete guidance therefrom. The trouble is that the many 
stated objectives have long proved difficult to attain, singly 
as well as in combination, in the refractory world in which 
we are obliged to live. In such a world, one might be tempted 
to dismiss the 1978 Act as a mere manifesto, a "Son of S. 
380," a hodgepodge of compromise. Taken seriously, the 
Act represents no more of a mandate and no less of a resolve
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than its 1946 predecessor. 7 Willy-nilly, implementation 
would have to proceed selectively, judiciously, but with eyes 
dutifully fixed on all gauges; and different good-faith mixes 
of emphasis are conceivable and inevitable. A plausible case 
could be made, for example, for heavy reliance on ex 
perience gained in administration of the Employment 
Act—for accent, accordingly, on attainment of the "best" 
practicable combination of near-term jobless and inflation 
rates without prejudice to achievement of more distant target 
rates. Alternatively, an earnest administrator could start 
with the view held by many legislators over the years—that 
the Employment Act had "failed" because joblessness has 
persisted at intolerable rates, especially for certain visible 
categories in the labor force. Accordingly, emphasis would 
be placed on "structural" measures, as outlined in Title II of 
the 1978 law, for training and placement of disadvantaged 
minorities, youths, and other potential or actual members of 
the hard-core unemployed, even at the risk, perhaps, of 
perceptibly enlarging a few successive federal budgetary 
deficits.
The Carter Council of Economic Advisers and the surviv 
ing primary cosponsor of the 1978 law have disagreed sharp 
ly on the strategy of implementation, taking, roughly, the 
two opposing positions just described. The divergence is 
especially striking since the Council actively assisted in the 
framing of the law. In the 1979 and 1980 Economic Report 
of the President, the law was interpreted as a resolve to con 
centrate on both unemployment and inflation while 
cognizance is taken of other stated economic desiderata.
7. The chairman of the National Commission for Manpower Policy, Eli Ginzberg, refers in 
a paper published in 1979 to the "great many compromises" required by the Humphrey- 
Hawkins Act "in the final effort to obtain passage" (Clark Kerr and J.M. Rosow, eds., 
Work in America: The Decade Ahead, New York, Van Nostrand Reinhold, p. 84). In 
another reference to the same Act (p. 261), a prominent labor journalist, A.H. Raskin, 
speaks of "this belated effort to make real the commitment so artfully fudged in the 
Employment Act of 1946"—"the right to a job for everyone willing and able to work."
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From this view, the practical meaning of the law is that it ex 
plicitly adds a price dimension to Employment Act goals, re 
quires the design and discussion of future numerical paths, 
and properly brings the Federal Reserve into the game. As 
soon as Section 304 of the law permitted, the president defer 
red achievement of the original 1983 target unemployment 
rates to 1985 and of the original 1983 target rate for inflation 
to 1988 8—by which time the Consumer Price Index had 
originally been scripted to be level. Although no new later 
date was given for this leveling, the event has obviously been 
postponed to the 1990s.
The surviving principal cosponsor of the 1978 law did not 
have to wait for the revision of dates in the 1980 Report to 
claim 11 "violations." 9 He found a basis for his charges in 
the contents of the 1979 Report and a Budget Message and in 
the actions of the pertinent congressional committees. Ac 
cording to his interpretation, the reduction of unemploy 
ment has a unique near-term priority that cannot be com 
promised by any immediate concern for inflationary "trade 
off and that must be supported by structural measures 
without regard to budgetary consequences. The scenario 
calls for full production and full employment first, with 
subsequent price stability and budget balance thereby 
rendered more achievable. A later statement by the same 
congressman ignores the 1980 timetable revisions but renews 
charges of wholesale violation of the law and insists on the 
need for a budget that is "highly stimulative rather than
8. Economic Report of the President, January 1980, pp. 9-10, 90-97. In The 1980 Joint 
Economic Report, Senate Report No. 96-618, 1980, p. 75, the Joint Economic Committee 
remarked: "While the necessity of revising these goals is certainly unfortunate, it is equally 
necessary to preserve the validity of the Humphrey-Hawkins process by making the 
timetable more realistic, particularly in light of long-term economic problems for which 
there are no easy short-term solutions."
9. "Optimum Growth, Price Stability and Full Employment," an undated statement issued 
"from the office of Congressman Gus Hawkins."
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restrictive." 10 A still later pre-election rebuke of the Carter 
Administration for failure to implement the law as a 
blueprint for full employment was planned but not carried 
out; it was recognized to have much less chance of changing 
the president's position than of changing the minds of some 
voters. 11
The incoming chairman of the Joint Economic Commit 
tee, a veteran congressman who fared better than his party in 
November, made a post-election statement reaffirming jobs 
and prices as the twin pillars, rather than opposing poles, of 
policy and asserting the dominance of both in voter 
judgments:
The aim of economic policy is full employment 
without inflation. The Democrats have failed to 
achieve this aim, and that's why we were thrown 
out of office. 12
Genesis of the New Ordeal
As a prelude to examination of the variety of proposed 
remedies, we note the rather consistent views of the experts 
on the etiology of the economy's inflation-unemployment 
disease. In November 1980, the month of critical change in 
national leadership, unemployment stood at about 7.5 per 
cent of the labor force, the "core" or "underlying" rate of 
inflation13 was at or above 9 percent, and a still higher prime
10. Congressional Record, House of Representatives, Vol. 126, No. 63, April 23,1980. The 
same general position is taken by Congressman P.J. Mitchell in The 1980 Joint Economic 
Report, pp. 106-10.
11. Washington Post, September 27, 1980.
12. Washington Post, November 14, 1980.
13. The "core" rate, referring to price increases attributable to increases in trend costs of 
labor and other inputs to production, is distinguished from the contributions of external 
"shocks" and excess or deficient "demand." See, for example, Otto Eckstein and Robin 
Siegel, "More on Core Inflation," Data Resources U.S. Review, June 1979, pp. 1.19-1.24; 
and The 1980 Joint Economic Report, pp. 34-37.
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interest rate that had not yet peaked threatened to throttle a 
nascent recovery. For all of its results, the "moral equivalent 
of war" to which the nation had been summoned earlier by 
President Carter could just as well have been called "oral.'*
Authoritative economists of all persuasions tend to agree 
that the nation's economic health began to deteriorate 
seriously in the mid-1960s. The patient soon lapsed into an 
"age of the second derivative;" 14 hope of stabilization of the 
price level was lost, and mere stabilization of the rate of price 
increase came to be regarded as a "cure." Errors of neglect, 
diagnosis, and treatment were many; but there is also ample 
evidence of the poverty and primitiveness of the healing arts, 
with doctors not knowing what to do as well as unable to 
agree. Here is a retrospective comment offered early in 1980 
by a Nixon economic adviser:
Much of our failure to control inflation over the 
past fifteen years can be laid to a lag in perceptions. 
Inflation first became serious in 1965, but we did 
not realize how dangerous it was and so failed to 
adopt strong enough measures to restrain it. As 
people caught on to the fact that the action was in 
adequate, they came to expect prices to go even 
higher. These expectations helped fulfill the 
prophecy. A self-reinforcing process began that has 
made inflation more fearsome and difficult to 
bring down . . . , 15
14. Inflation has accustomed economists, and taught the general public, to shift attention 
from changes in price (and wage) levels to changes in the rates of increase. See the remarks 
by Herbert Stein, "Achieving Credibility," in William Fellner, Project Director, Contem 
porary Economic Problems, Washington, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy 
Research, 1980, p. 46; and by M.N. Baily, in a comment on the first Perry paper cited in 
footnote 3 (p. 126).
15. Herbert Stein, "The Failure of Carter's Anti-Inflation Policy," Fortune, March 24, 
1980, p. 50.
14 Looking Backward & Forward (1980)
A statement offered at about the same time to a congres 
sional committee by the only chairman of the Council of 
Economic Advisers who has also headed the Federal Reserve 
System assigns heavy responsibility to the federal govern 
ment for the "present virulent inflation." He cites the 
government's bias toward stimulus, its interference with 
market forces, and its "needlessly expensive ways" of pursu 
ing worthwhile improvements in the quality of living. Con 
cerning the first of these, he said:
Undue stimulus through fiscal and monetary policy 
tends to generate inflationary pressures by causing 
the aggregate demand for goods and services to rise 
above the level that can be supplied at existing 
prices. This is how the current inflation was 
precipitated in the fatal year 1965, when our 
government sought simultaneously to fight a war in 
Vietnam and to launch the Great Society at home 
while reducing tax rates instead of raising them. 16
He recalled the "unprecedented effort" of the New 
Economics "to accelerate the growth of an already expand 
ing economy by a massive cut in business and personal in 
come taxes." The gambit "was initially counted as a brilliant 
success":
But as our economy was pressed to its limits by ex 
pansionist policies, it became highly inflation- 
prone; and the rest is history. 17
A prominent "liberal" economist, from the vantage point 
of 1975, saw an ironic parallel in the 1968 Economic Report
16. A.F. Burns, The Perils of Inflation, Reprint No. 110, Washington, American Enter 
prise Institute for Public Policy Research, March 1980, pp. 5-6.
17. Ibid., p. 4. Additional pertinent observations by A.F. Burns are scattered through 
various papers included in his Reflections of an Economic Policy Maker, Speeches and 
Congressional Statements: 1969-1978, Washington, American Enterprise Institute for 
Public Policy Research, 1978.
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of the President and the State of the Union message sent by 
Coolidge to the Congress in December 1928; both documents 
exuded satisfaction in discovery of the keys to prosperity. He 
discusses "four serious flaws" of the New Economics that 
are "now wonderfully clear"—the fallibility of forecasting 
as a basis for action in advance of need, the inadequacy of 
machinery for dealing with excessive market power of cor 
porations and unions, the undependability of fiscal policy 
for inflation control via tax increase and expenditure reduc 
tion, and a misplaced faith in monetary policy. 18
The 1979 Report acknowledged that "the current inflation 
has been gathering momentum for over 10 years," at 
tributing the acceleration to the addition of Vietnam 
pressures to "an economy already approaching high employ 
ment." It noted the role of stimulative fiscal and monetary 
policies in setting the scene for restrictive actions that bring 
recession. But the purgative power of recession, far from 
restoring prices to an earlier level, may be overwhelmed by 
the power of pro-inflationary behaviors encouraged by prior 
inflationary experience:
Once under way, a high rate of inflation generates 
responses and adaptations by individuals and in 
stitutions that perpetuate the wage-price spiral, 
even in periods of economic slack. Expectations 
develop that wages and prices will continue to rise 
at a rapid rate. . . . The formal and informal adap 
tations'to a long-standing inflation exert a powerful 
force tending to sustain inflation even after the 
originating causes have disappeared. 19
In June 1977, the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development published Towards Full Employment and
18. Galbraith, op. cit., pp. 326 ff.
19. Economic Report of the President, January 1979, p. 55.
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Price Stability, the report of a "group of independent ex 
perts" headed by a former chairman of the Council of 
Economic Advisers. 20 The introduction to the report 
observes that "disquietingly high" rates of unemployment 
and inflation have followed the unprecedented growth that 
the Western nations enjoyed in the quarter century after 
World War II. The title of the first chapter asks "what went 
wrong," and the first sentence proceeds to answer:
Going back to the 1960s, in the United States, 
failure adequately to finance the war in Vietnam 
and major new social programmes through higher 
taxes led to increasing excess demand, despite 
monetary restraint.
The chapter continues with a doleful synopsis of events and 
actions in the United States and Europe up to the fragile 
recovery of mid-1975. It concludes that the inflation of the 
1960s originated in labor markets while the inflation of the 
early 1970s originated in product markets (especially for 
petroleum and various crops); that the combination of 
"policy errors" (fiscal and monetary excesses) and supply 
"shocks" has built up stubborn inflationary expectations 
and hampered the growth of output and employment.
In an article published in 1980, a Kennedy economic ad 
viser made some observations that seem appropriate not only 
for concluding this section but also for introducing the next. 
He suggested "two interpretations of U.S. inflationary 
history since 1965" that lead in different policy directions:
One blames mistaken demand-management 
policies—they aimed at overfull employment, ac 
commodated too readily existing inflation and in 
flationary shocks, intervened too promptly and
20. The so-called "McCracken Report," to which reference was made in a work cited in 
footnote 3.
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energetically to arrest recessions and speed 
recoveries. According to this thesis, correct policies 
can bring price stability plus realistically full 
employment.
The other interpretation depends on the view that 
the price- and wage-setting institutions of the 
economy have an inflationary bias. Consequently, 
demand management cannot stabilize the price 
trend without chronic sacrifice of output and 
employment unless it is assisted, occasionally or 
permanently, by direct incomes policies of some 
kind. According to this second thesis, there is little 
hope that monetary and fiscal disinflation alone 
will cure the current stagflation. 21
While conceding "important elements of truth" in the first 
interpretation of developments since 1965, he finds it "very 
difficult to reject the hypothesis of structural inflationary 
bias." 22
"Redeem the Dream"
The threat posed by unchecked inflation to the efficiency 
of our economy and to the viability of our political system 
and society has stimulated considerable thought and writing 
on remedies. The prescribed regimens for draining the infla 
tionary fever vary in emphasis, details, and feasibility; in 
time requirements; in the kind, extent, and socioeconomic 
distribution of the sacrifices still demanded and in their pros 
pects of success. As might be expected, some plans solve by 
assumption various subproblems that other plans consider to 
be critical. It is also true that, in general, and for lack of 
knowledge rather than lack of concern, the goal of full
21. James Tobin, "Stabilization Policy Ten Years After," Brookings Papers on Economic 
Policy, 1:1980, p. 64.
22. Ibid., p. 65.
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employment is temporarily subordinated or ignored in belief 
that disinflation is the prerequisite to the possible attain 
ment. Explicitly or implicitly, furthermore, the Humphrey- 
Hawkins interpretation of the paramountcy of the employ 
ment goal, even in current circumstances, is rejected or 
unaddressed. On the other hand, proposals for disinflation 
tend to minimize or overlook the possible need to deal with 
concomitant increases in the incidence and severity of 
unemployment. A sampling of the views expressed in the 
very recent literature follows.
In a 1980 essay, the Nixon economic adviser cited in the 
preceding section reviewed four strategies and expressed his 
strong preference for the fourth, which he calls "committed 
gradualism." The other three involve: improbable and risky 
"shock treatment," an attempt to enforce zero inflation or 
something like it by sudden and drastic reduction of the 
growth rate of the money supply or of nominal (i.e., current- 
dollar) Gross National Product; restoration of some sort of 
linkage of the money supply to gold; and adoption of a con 
stitutional amendment imposing restraints on fiscal and 
monetary management. The one-time Nixon adviser 
observes that, in our country, "gradualism" (an intent to 
disinflate over a period of uncertain duration in which 
unemployment would remain a bit above the "natural rate") 
has "lost credibility" only because it has not been pursued 
"with the necessary persistence." The trick is to substitute 
"committed gradualism"—a five-year program of determin 
ed fiscal and monetary actions, undertaken with strong 
presidential leadership, bipartisan congressional support, 
and cooperation of the Federal Reserve, that could, if car 
ried out without digression or dilution, lead to an annual rate 
of price increase that is below 2 percent and to an annual rate 
of increase in the nominal Gross National Product that is, 
say, 4 percent. Changes would be required in budgetary pro 
cedures, but the program would eschew any explicit effort to
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restrain prices or wages or to meet a predesignated 
unemployment target rate. The former Nixon aide concedes 
that the opportunities for abandonment of "commitment" 
and for reversion to "short-run politics as usual" cannot be 
ruled out. 23
In the same 1980 testimony that was cited in the preceding 
section, a former Federal Reserve chairman likewise ex 
presses impatience with the familiar "gradualism," which 
calls for "mild measures over a period of five to ten years" 
but is vulnerable to "premature suspension or abandonment 
in practice." For "real headway," it is "essential to rout in 
flationary psychology," toward which end he proposes four 
kinds of action. The first is to revise the budget process so 
that Congress takes more responsibility for the legislation of 
deficits. (It should now consider cutting federal expen 
ditures, especially by weakening the role of "indexing" in 
Social Security and other entitlements.) The second is to at 
tenuate the cost-increasing effects of regulation. (He refers 
to the Davis-Bacon Act and laws concerning environment, 
health, and safety.) The third is congressional endorsement, 
by concurrent resolution, of Federal Reserve efforts to com 
bat inflation by monetary means. The fourth is reduction of 
business taxes over a five- to seven-year period (small in the 
first two) to stimulate capital expansion and productivity 
growth. 24
Kindred proposals were made in a paper issued by a 
distinguished Committee to Fight Inflation in June 1980. 
They include a curb on deficit-proneness of the Congress, 
support of the Federal Reserve's counterinflationary disposi 
tion, inhibition of government tendencies to raise prices by 
interference with the competitive process and by subjection 
of industry to excessive or overzealous regulation, tax relief
23. Stein, "Achieving Credibility," loc. cit., pp. 68-73.
24. Burns, The Perils of Inflation, pp. 9-10.
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for business, other measures to raise productivity (e.g., in 
crease in outlays for research and development and establish 
ment of intracompany productivity councils), and en 
couragement of domestic energy production and conserva 
tion by rapid decontrol of oil prices and addition of con 
sumption taxes. 25
The same Committee to Fight Inflation was encouraged by 
the Reagan election to issue another policy statement in 
December 1980. 26 In view of "significant changes ... in the 
political and social environment," it proposed a nine-point 
program that contemplated:
1. Reduction of projected federal expenditures for fiscal 
year 1981 (including off-budget outlays) by at least 2 per 
cent.
2. Stimulation of "productivity-enhancing" capital in 
vestment through reduction of business taxes for calendar 
year 1981 and through additional tax and expenditure cuts 
for fiscal year 1982.
3. Requirement of budget balance beginning with fiscal 
year 1983 unless a deficit is authorized by a majority in each 
house of Congress.
4. Establishment of a commission to explore ways to 
reduce the cost increase of entitlement programs.
5. Support of monetary policies that would constrain 
growth of the money supply over the next three or four years 
to rates "consistent with a stable consumer price level."
6. Adoption of youth differential in the minimum wage 
and rescission or amendment of the Davis-Bacon Act.
25. A Policy Statement, Committee to Fight Inflation, Washington, June 23, 1980. 
(Available from American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research.)
26. Second Policy Statement, Committee to Fight Inflation, Washington, December 24, 
1980. (Also available from American Enterprise Institute.)
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7. Revision of environmental, health, and safety regula 
tions to ensure achievement of "basic national 
objectives ... at minimum feasible cost."
8. Promotion of labor-management cooperation at the 
company level on behalf of productivity improvement.
9. Early decontrol of prices of oil and natural gas in the in 
terest of increasing domestic energy production.
A prescription offered in 1980 by a venerable Nobel 
economist residing in Britain unintentionally illuminates two 
of the dangerous social challenges that would confront na 
tions desirous of quickly descending from an inflationary or 
bit to the preferred ground of stable prices. One major 
challenge would arise from intense unemployment during an 
indefinitely "short" period of, say, a half year. The second 
involves exacerbation of intergenerational conflict, not only 
over the distribution of burdens and benefits but also over 
the tolerable length of the adjustment period. The renowned 
economist favors drastic monetary and fiscal measures to 
halt inflation in its tracks. He opposes gradualism as ineffec 
tual, especially in the presence of strong unions. At least for 
Britain, he regards an unemployment rate of 20 percent for 
six months as politically more feasible than a rate of 10 per 
cent extending over three years. He would not heed com 
plaints about high interest rates and would welcome 
bankruptcies that weed out weak managements and ineffi 
cient firms. He is against government intervention to help 
channel investment funds into ailing basic industries, such as 
automobiles and steel. Cautious about the claim of "supply- 
side" economics that a large marginal tax cut would induce 
substantial revenue increase, he is "afraid it may lead to 
large budget deficits and more inflation." 27
27. From interviews with Friedrich von Hayek reported in Business Week, December 15, 
1980, p. 110, and Wall Street Journal, December 16, 1980.
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A controversial line of attack on "rational expectations" 
of continuing brisk inflation rates acquired prominence dur 
ing the 1980 presidential campaign. The centerpiece of this 
program would be a three-year series of substantial reduc 
tions in federal tax rates. These cuts would be accompanied 
by sharp curtailment of nondefense expenditures, en 
couragement of business outlays to increase capital invest 
ment and revive productivity, and alleviation of the burden 
of regulation on industry. The scenario also envisages a con 
genial monetary policy. The program is supposed to reduce 
the interest rates demanded by lenders and to raise 
dramatically the propensity to save. Many economists fear 
that attempts to carry out the program will actually ag 
gravate the inflation. In any case, a transition period of 
dislocation and unemployment cannot be skipped before 
"normalcy" is restored. 28
The program just described is rooted in "supply-side" 
economics, which has an appealing optimistic cast. Thus, 
even before the election month in 1980, the majority and 
minority members of the Joint Economic Committee were 
able to issue a unified annual report emphasizing "supply- 
side" measures rather than continuing efforts at demand 
management. They envisaged a coordinated attack on infla 
tion and unemployment by adoption of a pro-growth 
package of "consistent and mutually reinforcing" policies. 
Thus, inflation would be fought by gradual and sustained 
slowdown in the expansion of the money supply and by 
gradual reduction of the federal share of the Gross National
28. "Reagan's Top Problem: Braking Inflation Expectations," Business Week, December 
1, 1980, pp. 104-10.
It appears from a new Louis Harris poll that "a clear 55-to-41 percent majority of 
Americans opposes any cut in the federal income tax"—"despite the high priority that the 
incoming administration of Ronald Reagan has given to a 10 percent federal tax cut." The 
public's reluctance reflects belief that "such a cut would be inflationary." On the other 
hand, the same poll shows a 63-to-29 percent majority in favor of tax incentives for 
business investment. (Reported in Washington Post, December 1, 1980.)
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Product. General unemployment would be fought by 
stimulation of economic growth through tax reductions that 
offer incentives to invest, save, work, and produce. Struc 
tural unemployment would be fought by realistic on-the-job 
training in the private sector. 29
In May 1980, a tax expert who is a strong advocate of 
"supply-side" economics told the Joint Economic Commit 
tee that incentives could be used skillfully to combat both 
unemployment and inflation—as the Committee had already 
decided in its review of the President's Economic Report. He 
would shift the focus of attention in policy from aggregates 
to the marginal decisions of individuals, households, and 
firms in response to changes in relative prices. More 
specifically, he denied the validity of the Phillips curve and 
the Keynesian multiplier as policy tools and counseled tight 
money and significant tax cuts to induce behavioral changes 
in behalf of greater price stability and fuller employment. 30
Testifying on a presidential anti-inflation message in 
March 1980, the current Federal Reserve chairman not only 
showed disfavor of overreliance on monetary macho but also 
balked at the idea of early tax cuts, even for the stimulation 
of business investment. The times required a "coordinated" 
credible approach to inflation control that included fiscal 
restraint (preferably, an attempt to balance the 1981 budget) 
and energy policy as well as a tight rein on the money 
supply. 31
29. Based on summary remarks by Representative C.J. Brown, The 1980 Joint Economic 
Report, p. 5.
30. See testimony of N.B. Ture at a Hearing Before the Joint Economic Committee on 
Forecasting the Supply Side of the Economy, May 21, 1980, pp. 61-74.
31. P.A. Volcker, in Hearings Before the Joint Economic Committee on the President's 
New Anti-inflation Program, March 17, 20, and 27, 1980, pp. 102 ff; and Washington 
Post, December 4, 1980.
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A Wall Street economist whose pronouncements are 
highly respected in the investment community has, like the 
Federal Reserve chairman, expressed skepticism concerning 
the economic scenario that has strong support in the new 
Reagan Administration. In his judgment, the intent to cut 
taxes sharply while also raising defense spending sharply will 
keep interest rates high and fail to puncture the inflationary 
expectations of investors and workers. Continuing rises in 
energy and food prices, he observed, hold forth the prospect 
of continuing pro-inflationary wage advances. 32
In October 1979, the Federal Reserve was thought to have 
embarked on a more extreme "monetarist" course as it 
shifted emphasis toward restriction of the growth of the 
money supply with less regard for the stability of interest 
rates. The stage for this shift had been set by the failure of 
government to achieve occasional budget balances or 
surpluses in recent times. The shift is also consonant with 
legislative requirements of 1975 (House Concurrent Resolu 
tion No. 133) and 1978 (Humphrey-Hawkins Act, Section 
108) that quarterly and annual target rates of money growth 
be publicly declared. Attainment of the near-term targets, 
however, has proved difficult. Professional opinion is far 
from unanimous on the most relevant money aggregate, the 
sensitivity of output and prices to change in this aggregate, 
the lead times, and the preferred strategy of restraint 
(gradualism versus shock). Other factors also suggest that a 
clearcut test of the efficacy of "monetarism" is not at 
hand—the Federal Reserve's position as stated above, its 
conflicting requirements to manage the money supply and to 
accommodate the Treasury in deficit-financing, popular and 
political concern for business solvency and jobs, and the
32. Henry Kaufman, in Washington Post, December 10, 1980.
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unhappy experience of Britain in its current wrestling with 
"slumpflation." 33
The best-known advocate of monetary monism—the 1976 
Nobel laureate in economics—has stated his credo on "the 
cure for inflation" in a chapter of this title in a new popular 
book. 34 He asserts "five simple truths" by way of conclu 
sion: that "inflation is a monetary phenomenon arising from 
a more rapid increase in the quantity of money than in out 
put"; that government essentially controls the money sup 
ply; that the "only cure for inflation" is to slow the growth 
of this supply; that time is required for cure even as it was re 
quired for development of inflation; and that "unpleasant 
side effects" of the cure, such as substantial unemployment, 
are "unavoidable." A choice between unemployment and 
inflation, in his view, is an "illusion": "The real option is 
only whether we have higher unemployment as a result of 
higher inflation or as a temporary side effect of curing infla 
tion."
A leading econometrician associated with the Brookings 
Institution reported in a 1980 paper that his "model" at 
tributes the recent "dismal record of the * discomfort 
index* " to "exogenous shocks and a large upward shift in 
the inflation norm." To slow this shift, he suggests six 
possibilities. The first is to maintain high unemployment, 
and the second, which entails the first, is to keep fiscal and 
monetary policy "tight." The third is to announce and
33. On this paragraph, see Volcker's testimony (footnote 31); J.A. Davenport, "A Testing 
Time for Monetarism," Fortune, October 6,1980, pp. 42-48; two articles in Burns' Reflec 
tions, "Money Targets and Credit Allocation," pp. 367-78, and "The Independence of the 
Federal Reserve System," pp. 379-85; "The Redefined Monetary Aggregates," Federal 
Reserve Bulletin, February 1980, pp. 97-114; Milton Friedman, "Inflation and Unemploy 
ment," cited in footnote 3; T.M. Humphrey, "The Persistence of Inflation," Economic 
Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, September-October 1979, pp. 3-15; and The 
Economist, November 29, 1980, pp. 11-13 and 19-23.
34. Milton and Rose Friedman, Free to Choose: A Personal Statement, New York: Har- 
court Brace Jovanovich, 1980, pp. 237-270.
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adhere to a "credible restrictive policy," and the fourth is to 
"reduce prices relative to wages without squeezing normal 
margins"; the intent of both would be to moderate infla 
tionary expectations. The fifth is to offer tax incentives for 
wage and price moderation, and the sixth is to impose direct 
restraints, ranging from guidelines to strict controls. A 
preference is expressed for use of a workable tax-based in 
comes policy to complement slack-inducing macroeconomic 
policy. 35
Many other economists see a supportive role for penalty or 
reward systems, or even for stricter controls, in larger pro 
grams aimed at disinflation. The purpose is to alleviate the 
unemployment that would be induced by demand-restraining 
measures. Despite much discussion of incomes policies in the 
past decade or longer, there is little agreement on ap 
propriate design and administration; some of the varieties 
appear to have been influenced in their details by emanations 
from the ghosts of Lewis Carroll and Rube Goldberg. 36 In 
1978, the Carter Administration proposed "real-wage in 
surance" as an inducement to unions to honor the pay target 
set in the new stabilization program. 37 Despite the cogency of 
the concept, the scheme was poorly crafted and poorly pro 
moted; by protecting inflaters, it would have legitimized an 
"underlying" inflation rate already intolerably high and re 
quiring reversal, not reinforcement.
The writings thus far sampled seem hopeful, though 
guarded; but some others, even when compatible with opin-
35. Perry, "Inflation in Theory and Practice," he. cit., pp. 239-41.
36. Various tax-based incomes policies are discussed in essays by L.S. Seidman, A.P. 
Lerner, and L.L. Dildine and E.M. Sunley in the Brookings volume already cited, Curing 
Chronic Inflation; in Sidney Weintraub, Keynes and the Monetarists, New Brunswick, 
Rutgers University Press, 1973; and in papers by A.P. Lerner and Sidney Weintraub in 
J.H. Gapinski and C.E. Rockwood, eds., Essays in Post-Keynesian Inflation, Cambridge, 
Ballinger, 1979.
37. Economic Report of the President, January 1979, pp.9 and 82-84.
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ions already cited above, sound less reassuring. For example, 
a Princeton professor told the Joint Economic Committee in 
May 1980 that we need "patience," a quality "sadly lacking 
in past economic policy." In any case, it appears that "we 
must face up to the fact that an inflation problem that has 
been building for 15 years may take just as long to be 
cured." He proposed a "long-term policy" of "moderate 
slack, coupled with whatever * supply side' initiatives we can 
dream up to improve productivity growth"—the "only anti- 
inflation medicine that is not pure snake oil." 38
A well-known monetary economist, contributing to a 
volume published in 1979, ventured that his profession 
"does not have much to say about how to extricate oneself 
without great difficulty from an inflationary process," so he 
would be "very happy" if his fellow-contributors "could 
reach a consensus, not perhaps on how to eliminate inflation 
completely, but at least on how we can lessen the rate of in 
flation." Having had "the sad experience of seeing many 
different efforts at combating inflation fail," he is skeptical 
of "any simple scheme." He does suggest, however, that an 
anti-inflation program has to be a "combined and determin 
ed effort carried out along many different fronts." A curb 
on government spending is necessary, "but this action must 
be combined with wage policy and with other policies which 
at least will provide a period of adjustment during which 
people can be led to change their expectations about future 
inflation." 39
Writing in 1979, a distinguished economist who has been 
president of the American Association for the Advancement 
of Science as well as the American Economic Association 
came to "a rather pessimistic conclusion that the prospects
38. A.S. Blinder, in Hearings before the Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the 
United States, May 28 and 29, 1980, p. 40.
39. Don Patinkin, "The Inflationary Experience: Some Lessons from Israel," in Essays in 
Post-Keynesian Economics, pp. 133-34.
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for control of inflation are not very good." Although he 
thinks that "a full-employment, anti-inflation policy is feasi 
ble," he hastens to add that it demands "more knowledge 
than we now have, a somewhat different data base, and a 
very different political image and will." In particular, his 
policy would involve drastic federal intervention "in existing 
financial contracts." Since "politically we are simply not 
prepared to do this," he expects the inflation to continue. 40
Finally, a post-Keynesian school of economists that seeks 
to replace inadequate "orthodox" theory offers an uncom 
mon diagnosis of inflation and arrives at an uncommon pro 
posal for remedy. According to this school, inflation arises 
not from excess demand or too rapid growth of the money 
supply but from conflict over the distribution of available in 
come and output. Restrictive monetary and fiscal policies 
limit the available totals and thereby intensify the struggle 
for shares. An incomes policy, which is nowadays proposed 
as a means of mitigating the unemployment accompanying 
restrictive anti-inflationary measures, is seen instead by the 
new school as the proper fruit of a prior national consensus 
covering all categories of claimants. This consensus, 
established by a social and economic planning organ in 
which all interest groups are represented, "would finally per 
mit government to pursue a maximum growth or 'full 
employment' policy without having to fear the inflationary 
consequences." 41 It is safe to surmise that this paragraph will 
not influence the approach taken by the hew Administration 
and the new Congress in the quest for fuller employment 
with less inflation.
40. K.E. Boulding, "Inflation as a Process in Human Learning," in Essays in Post- 
Keynesian Economics, especially p. 30.
41. Eichner, "A Look Ahead," in ,4 Guide to Post-Keynesian Economics, pp. 174-84. See 
also, in the same volume, Eileen Appelbaum, "The Labor Market," pp. 117-19.
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New Era—or Error?
The dramatic shift of political power signaled by the 1980 
elections provides a basis for hope of more resolute and 
more effective leadership against inflation. A successful ear 
ly outcome should not be taken for granted, however, in 
view of the dreary economic history of the decades since the 
end of World War II; the origins, later sources, and long life 
of the current inflation; and the diversity of authoritative 
opinion regarding appropriate strategy and tactics. Further 
more, even if the struggle against inflation were eventually to 
succeed, any predesigned program of disinflation would 
most likely have to be revised extensively along the way. The 
original timetable, too, would probably prove overop- 
timistic. Accordingly, whatever the exact nature of the 
disinflation program that will be formulated initially by the 
new Administration, the remarks that follow should retain 
some relevance for evolving government policy. It should be 
recalled, for the sake of perspective, that the current 
fashionable revulsion against Keynesianism was preceded by 
a fashionable bipartisan tolerance; that the Nixon Ad 
ministration adopted wage and price controls despite profes 
sions of ideological abhorrence of such intervention.
Of special interest for this book is the near certainty that a 
determined attack on inflation would entail a concomitant 
substantial rise in the general level of unemployment. Such a 
rise is suggested by the inevitability of a central role for 
monetary restraint. Furthermore, workers in particular in 
dustries, regions, and localities may be expected to ex 
perience prolonged idleness as a result of fiscal retrench 
ments, the unwillingness or inability of state and local 
governments to fill gaps in federal outlays, the limited 
geographic and interfirm mobility of older disemployed per 
sons, and so forth. Although stimulative tax changes and 
new defense spending could favorably affect some area
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economies and assist some industries damaged in fierce inter 
national competition (e.g., automobiles and steel), they 
could hardly arrest the worldwide shift in manufacturing ac 
tivity, reverse the decline of major central cities, or reduce 
decisively the high rates of joblessness for young persons.
Assignment of top priority to the mastery of inflation need 
not, of course, imply repudiation of the earlier federal 
resolve to promote "maximum employment." All the objec 
tives stated in Section 2 of the Employment Act, as amended 
in the Humphrey-Hawkins Act, remain appropriate, 
whatever party is in the ascendant. While the objectives re 
main fixed, the weights assigned to the various desiderata are 
alterable in the light of changing economic conditions and 
perceptions. As for the specific milestones of the Humphrey- 
Hawkins Act, precedent for benign neglect has existed from 
the very beginning. Continued neglect would be much less 
provocative than a gratuitous alternative course that has 
recently been proposed: "repeal" of the Act in toto or, at 
least, of the "unrealistic" prescription of a 4 percent goal for 
unemployment. 42
Only an economic flatworm would be satisfied to view the 
processes of inflation and disinflation simply in terms of 
rates of change in prices, output, and the money supply. 
Government leaders unfortunately have to recognize and 
take due account of the social and political dimensions of the 
two phenomena. The conduct of a serious disinflation pro 
gram is bound to expose and sharpen the intergroup dif 
ferences, tensions, rivalries, and conflicts that contributed to 
the buildup of inflation in the first place. 43 In particular, 
stern counterinflationary action could sufficiently aggravate
42. Stein, "Achieving Credibility," loc. cit., p. 73.
43. For sophisticated discussions of the noneconomic aspects of inflation, see the essays in 
Fred Hirsch and J.H. Goldthorpe, eds., The Political Economy of Inflation, Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1978.
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unemployment to the point of threatening national 
cohesiveness and public order.
The latent danger to social and political stability counsels 
the desirability of offering incentives that would shorten the 
disinflation process and reduce its human pain. Specifically, 
a disinflation package might well provide, through tax 
credits or low-interest bonds redeemable at public conve 
nience, for protection of the purchasing power of the earn 
ings of wage and salary workers who agree to forgo pay in 
creases in excess of the prospective national rate of produc 
tivity advance. The offer of protection to such workers 
would have the double merit of increasing the ratio of 
noninflaters to witting or unwitting inflaters and of 
discouraging the "pre-indexation" of unit labor cost that 
prolongs upward pressure on prices into the future.
Four additional comments elucidate this proposal for con 
structive enlistment of employees in the fight against infla 
tion:
1. The proposal is not just another member of the motley 
family of "incomes policies" that political leaders disen 
chanted with "controls" are inclined to eschew categorical 
ly. It does not require enforcement by company 
managements acting as gendarmes or deputies for the state. 
Indeed, it is consistent with the notion of economic freedom 
that the new Administration wishes to enlarge. By appealing 
to selfish interest, it seeks to motivate voluntary behavior for 
the larger public good.
2. As a "supply-side" instrument, the proposal promises 
far less ambiguous counterinflationary benefit than does, 
say, a preset multiyear reduction in marginal tax rates for all 
income earners.
3. The proposal should not be confused with the Carter 
concept of "real wage insurance" that it might have in-
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spired. The latter was intended to protect workers getting 
pay increases up to 7 percent—far above the expected na 
tional rate of productivity advance. This idea could only 
have made the inflationary result of the annual union game 
of "catch-up chicken" easier to forecast; it was not aimed at 
ending the game.
4. The same criterion of purchasing-power protection is 
appropriate for workers in both the private and public sec 
tors. (In earlier years of the current inflation, the federal 
government missed an opportunity, as the nation's largest 
and most concerned employer, to set an example for others 
to follow by restricting its pay increases to the national rate 
of productivity gain. Adjustment of federal pay instead for 
so-called "comparability" with the private sector was never 
technically sound and has served as a mechanism for prop 
agation of "wage inflation.")
Finally, the notion just elaborated for encouragement of 
voluntary wage restraint is also adaptable to other disinfla 
tionary programs—for example, the stimulation of net new 
personal saving. Thus, instead of hoping that a sizable 
multiyear income tax cut would significantly increase net 
savings, the federal government could provide a direct incen 
tive in the form of a tax credit.
In the course of preparation of this introductory chapter 
to a new edition of a work that began to take shape in the 
very dawn of the New Ordeal, a passage in a poem by the 
eminent Victorian, Matthew Arnold, often came to mind:
We do not what we ought; 
What we ought not, we do; 
And lean upon the thought 
That Chance will bring us through.
May our nation's quest for fuller employment with less infla 
tion during the next decade and a half warrant a more 
positive retrospective assessment.
